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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission) is right to 
declare that refugees and asylum seekers are amongst the most vulnerable 
to human rights violations in the development and execution of counter-
terrorist measures.1  States have not only used their immigration laws to 
arrest, detain, question and deport non-nationals suspected of being involved 
in terrorism,2 but fear of terrorism has led states to declare a state of 
emergency and derogate from human rights treaties, enabling them to detain 
non-nationals in a manner that would normally breach their human rights. 
 
The Commission’s Report on Terrorism and Human Rights (Report)3 is an 
important and comprehensive document outlining the current rights of states 
and protections available to refugees/asylum seekers within the Inter-
American System, in relation to counter terrorism measures.  While it goes 
into detail about a non-national’s right to liberty and security, humane 
treatment, fair trial and due process of law, it does not discuss whether the 
norm of non-refoulement is derogable.  The right to non-refoulement, in the 
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Inter-American system, is found within article 22(8) of the American 
Convention of Human Rights (ACHR)4.  Article 22(8) states that 
 
‘In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, 
regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country 
his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated 
because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political 
opinions.’ 
 
It is a major failing of the Report that it does not take into account the fact that 
in a climate of terrorist attacks, states are likely to declare a state of 
emergency and take measures to derogate from their duties under the ACHR 
and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM).  If 
states are able to derogate from the norm of non-refoulement, then the rights 
outlined in the Report are of no practical importance to a refugee/asylum 
seeker.  The right to non-refoulement is the gateway through which a 
refugee/asylum seeker can access all other rights.  It is therefore important to 
determine the extent to which states, within the Inter-American system, can 
derogate from the norm of non-refoulement. 
 
While the right to non-refoulement is not specifically stated to be non-
derogable within the ACHR, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Court) and the Commission can and should use the 1951 Refugee 
Convention5 and customary international law, as well as their own methods of 
interpretation, to prevent the principle of non-refoulement being derogable 
within the terms of article 27 ACHR.  The 1951 Convention does not make 
any allowance for derogation and as such the right of non-refoulement held 
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within the 1951 Convention is non-derogable.  A state can not, therefore, take 
measures which would in effect derogate from that convention.  Similarly, to 
the extent a norm of customary international law is based on a non-derogable 
right within a treaty, the norm itself is non-derogable.  This means that those 
elements of the customary international law norm of non-refoulement that 
reflect non-derogable treaty rights are also non-derogable.  This paper will 
elaborate on the following statements to support the assertion that the 
principle of non-refoulement is non-derogable within the Inter-American 
System: 
 
• For those states that have ratified the 1951 Convention, the right to 
non-refoulement contained within article 33 is non-derogable, by virtue 
of the fact that any other interpretation would fall foul of article 27(1) 
and article 29 (b) ACHR; 
• The customary international law right to non-refoulement is non-
derogable under article 27 and article 29(d) ACHR; 
• The right to non-refoulement is an integral part of each fundamental 
non-derogable right contained within article 27(2) ACHR and therefore 
non-derogable for as much as it is contained within them; 
• To the extent that article 22(8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM are 
essential to the full realisation of the non-derogable rights listed in 
article 27(2), they themselves are non-derogable. 
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2. Legal Framework Regarding Derogation within the Inter-American 
System 
 
Most human rights treaties contain a provision allowing a state to derogate 
from certain rights within that treaty in a state of emergency.  Article 27 ACHR 
is the relevant provision that allows states to derogate not only from the 
ACHR, but has also been read into the ADRDM to allow states to derogate 
from that instrument as well6.  Article 27 sets out a strict criteria that a state 
has to fulfil in order to be entitled to derogate.  The Commission has stated 
that states have to satisfy the following test in order to derogate within the 
meaning of article 27: 
 
‘The ability of states to take measures derogating from protections 
under the human rights instruments to which they are bound is strictly 
governed by several conditions, which are in turn broadly regulated by 
the generally recognized principles of proportionality, necessity and 
non-discrimination. 
In order to consider that there is an emergency justifying suspension of 
rights, there must be an extremely grave situation of such a nature that 
there is a real threat to law and order or the security of the state, 
including an armed conflict, public danger, or other emergency that 
imperils the public order or security of a member state. 
Any suspension may only be for such time as is strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation and may not be proclaimed for indefinite or 
prolonged periods. 
Any suspension may only be effectuated to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation, and thereby precludes the 
unnecessary suspension of rights, the imposition of restrictions more 
severe than necessary, or the unnecessary extension of suspension to 
regions or areas not affected by the emergency. 
Any suspension of rights cannot entail discrimination of any kind on 
such grounds as race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin.  
Any suspension must be compatible with all of a member state’s other 
obligations under international law.’7 
 
Article 27(2) also provides further limitations to a state’s ability to derogate by 
asserting that certain rights can never be derogated from, including the right 
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to life and humane treatment.  Although the Commission has stated that 
article 27(2) ACHR enumerates all of the rights that may not be the subject of 
derogation, it should be noted that article 27(1) requires that any suspension 
of guarantees must not be ‘inconsistent with that state’s other obligations 
under international law’. 
 
3. The Right of Non-Refoulement contained within International 
Instruments 
 
The right of non-refoulement is the cornerstone of international refugee 
protection.  In terms of the 1951 Convention, it prevents the return of a 
refugee to a state where her life or freedom would be threatened on account 
of her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.  In human rights law, it applies to prevent a state returning an 
individual to a place where there is a real risk her fundamental human rights 
would be violated. 
 
The 1951 Convention makes no provision for derogations.  Its provisions are 
non derogable, including the right of non-refoulement.  Although the right of 
non-refoulement is non-derogable, it is, however, subject to certain limitations 
within the 1951 Convention.  Only refugees have the right not to be returned 
and the definition of ‘refugee’ is itself restricted by the application of article 1F 
of the 1951 Convention.  Article 1F excludes those who would otherwise be 
refugees, from refugee status, on the grounds that there are serious reasons 
for considering that they have committed a crime against humanity, a serious 
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non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to admission, or acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN.  Another limitation is held 
within the non-refoulement article itself.  Article 33(2) denies the benefit of 
non-refoulement to ‘a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country’.  It can be seen that 
this could lead to those suspected of committing or having the intent to 
commit terrorist crimes being returned to states where their life or freedom is 
in danger.  These limitations have the potential to reduce dramatically the 
protection given by non-refoulement.  They also leave the process open to 
discrimination as countries increasingly target specific nationalities and 
religions as breeding ground for potential terrorists and reduce the quality of 
proof needed to make a ‘dangerous to the security of the country’ 
determination. 
 
Human rights instruments, while in the main allowing for some derogation, do 
not have the limitations inherent in the refugee law concept of non-
refoulement.  The protection given by article 22(8) ACHR has no equivalent to 
article 1F or 33(2).  It does not allow anyone to be returned to a country 
where their right to life or freedom would be threatened on account of their 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion regardless of whether they are a refugee or constitute a danger to 
society.  Article 3, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CAT)8 is similarly absolute in its 
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terms and prevents an individual being returned to a state where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being 
tortured.  While on the face of it article 22 ACHR is derogable, article 3 CAT is 
not. 
 
There are also an increasing number of ‘soft law’ instruments prohibiting non-
refoulement in regard to specific violations.  The UN Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances1992 prevents 
expulsion, return or extradition where there are substantial grounds to believe 
a person would be in danger of enforced disappearance.  The UN principles 
on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions, prevent the same in relation to extra-legal, arbitrary 
and summary executions.  These instruments, while not per se legally 
binding, are indications of growing opinio juris on the norm of non-
refoulement.  Further, the Court has stated that 
 
‘The corpus juris of international human rights law comprises a set of 
international instruments of varied content and juridical effects 
(treaties, conventions, resolutions and declarations).  Its dynamic 
evolution has had a positive impact on international law in affirming 
and building up the latter’s faculty for regulating relations between 
States and the human beings within their respective jurisdictions.  This 
Court, therefore, must adopt the proper approach to consider this 
question in the context of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the 
human person in contemporary international law.9’ 
 
Both the Court and the Commission could therefore determine that the above 
declarations form part of the corpus juris of international human rights law 
and use them to shape their interpretation of the relevant sections within 
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ACHR/ADRDM and their determination of the customary law content of the 
norm of non-refoulement. 
 
4. The Customary International Law Principle of Non-Refoulement within 
the Inter-American System 
 
It is clear that in the past the content of the customary international law 
principle of non-refoulement, in a refugee law context, was based primarily 
upon article 33 of the 1951 Convention.  While this is still the case today, it 
could also be argued that the principle has now extended beyond the 
parameters of article 33 to protect those displaced persons who do not enjoy 
the protection of their government and are seen to be humanitarian 
‘refugees’.  Until recently there was controversy over whether states have a 
legal duty under customary international law not to return humanitarian 
refugees to their state of origin.  In customary law terms, the existence of 
such a legal duty depends first on whether states have refrained from 
returning such persons to their state of origin and, secondly, whether they did 
so in the belief that they are legally obliged to temporarily protect/non-refoule 
such persons.  The problem in declaring whether such a norm had evolved 
came not from a lack of state practice10, but whether there was sufficient 
opinio juris at a universal level to conclude that such a norm of customary 
international law has been created.  However, as Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 
make clear11, it is now undeniable that the principle of non-refoulement 
reflects customary international law.  Moreover, this problem is largely 
resolved in the Inter-American context by additional evidence that a regional 
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customary norm of non-refoulement of humanitarian refugees has 
crystallised.   The 1984 Cartagena Declaration and previous state adherence 
to it would suggest that OAS states have accepted they have a legal duty not 
to refoule humanitarian refugees. 
 
The 1984 Cartagena Declaration was drafted in response to mass migration 
and instability within the Americas in the 1980s.  Its drafting was part of a plan 
to bring peace and stability to the region and, to that end, the Declaration 
incorporated a realistic refugee definition.  The definition includes those 
fleeing ‘widespread violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive 
violations of human rights, or other circumstances which have seriously 
disturbed public order’12 as well as those that come within the traditional 1951 
Convention definition.  This widened definition is almost identical to the 
refugee definition within the OAU Convention, reflects those persons 
protected by UNHCR and includes those referred to as refugees by the 
Commission in its reports.  There have been several resolutions by the 
General Assembly of the OAS re-iterating the importance of the Cartagena 
Declaration13 and calls from the UNHCR and the Commission for states to 
adhere to it. 
 
In the years immediately preceding the drafting of the Cartagena Declaration, 
a number of OAS states incorporated the expanded refugee definition into 
their domestic refugee/asylum laws and that practice continues.  Currently, 
eight14 out of the thirty-five member states of the OAS have incorporated the 
expanded definition within their domestic laws, while others appear simply to 
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apply it in practice.  Paradoxically it appears that although some states have 
incorporated the expanded definition within their domestic laws, in practice 
they do not apply it.  In more recent years, there seems to have been a move 
away from the actual application of the expanded definition.  It is 
questionable, however, whether this shift in practice is sufficient to displace 
the presumption that the norm of non-refoulement in the Americas includes 
the right of everybody not to be returned to a state where their life or freedom 
would be in danger.  This is particularly the case where it appears that more 
and more human rights bodies are widening the principle of non-refoulement 
in relation to fundamental human rights. 
 
The human rights law content of the customary norm of non-refoulement quite 
clearly includes the right of an individual not to be returned to a country where 
he would be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.  Although neither the Commission nor the Court have had an 
opportunity to rule on the matter, the practice of other human rights bodies 
could provide useful guidance.  It is quite obvious from statements of the 
Commission, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights15 and 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC)16 that they consider the right of non-
refoulement an integral part of the prohibition of torture.  As the European 
Court of Human Rights stated in Soering v UK17  
 
‘It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, 
that "common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the 
rule of law" to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State 
knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. 
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Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in 
the brief and general wording of Article 3 (art. 3), would plainly 
be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article, and in the 
Court's view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to 
cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a 
real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
proscribed by that Article (art. 3).’ 
 
From the jurisprudence outlined above, it can be deduced that the reason that 
non-refoulement is disallowed in relation to a person where there are 
substantial reasons for believing he would be subject to torture on his return, 
is because the prohibition of torture is a fundamental non-derogable norm.  It 
follows that insofar as a right or prohibition is a fundamental norm, the 
corresponding right not to refoule someone when they would be in real 
danger of one of these norms being violated is similarly non-derogable.  The 
obligation of a state to respect the fundamental rights of an individual, such as 
to life, liberty and personal integrity, limits its ability to act where this would 
place the individual at risk.  Strict adherence to the principle of non-return is 
one way that such basic rights can be ensured.  Therefore, the content of the 
human rights law element of the customary international law right of non-
refoulement includes the right not to be returned where any of an individual’s 
fundamental human right norms would be violated. 
 
While the refugee law element of the customary norm of non-refoulement is 
subject to the limitations contained within article 1F and article 33(2) of the 
1951 Convention, the human rights law element of the customary right of non-
refoulement is an absolute right and not subject to any limitations regardless 
of whether a person is suspected of any involvement in terrorist acts18. 
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5. The Application of International Human Rights Instruments within the 
Inter-American System 
 
The Court and Commission can only apply the 1951 Convention or any other 
international agreement indirectly by using them as an aid to interpreting the 
Inter-American human rights instruments over which they have jurisdiction to 
‘adjudicate’19.  There is no complaints mechanism set out within the 1951 
Convention.  A dispute regarding the interpretation or application of the 1951 
Convention may be brought before the International Court of Justice by a 
state party.  In real terms, however, the 1951 Convention does not provide for 
the enforcement of its terms.  Although the Court and Commission cannot 
directly apply the 1951 Convention, it can be indirectly applied through the 
appropriate articles in the ACHR and the ADRDM.  The Commission has 
declared that the guarantees in article 22(7) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM 
reflect those contained within the 1951 Convention20 and has used the 1951 
Convention to develop the detailed content of the above articles in all cases 
involving refugee/asylum rights before it. 
 
The Commission has become increasingly proactive in fleshing out refugees 
and asylum seekers’ rights once they are admitted into a state.  It has, 
however, tended to concentrate on strengthening the procedural safeguards 
in place, as opposed to actually preventing the non-refoulement of individuals 
in violation of article 22(7) and (8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM.  This stance 
is understandable in relation to their reluctance to be a ‘fourth instance’21 
court.  However domestic adjudicating bodies within the region need more 
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guidance from the Court and Commission in interpreting the actual 
substantive content of the above articles. 
 
Although both the ACHR and the ADRDM contain the right to seek and 
receive asylum, the right of non-refoulement is only specifically spelled out in 
article 22 (8) ACHR.  This distinction could prove problematic if an OAS state 
has ratified neither the ACHR nor the 1951 Convention.  Article 27 ADRDM is 
subject to a dual criterion: the right to seek and receive asylum can only be 
relied upon if and to the extent that it has been spelled out in domestic law 
and the relevant international agreements have been ratified.  This dual 
criterion could result in a situation whereby a state that has not enshrined the 
right to asylum within its domestic legal system or ratified the 1951 
Convention, is not bound by article 27 ADRDM. 
 
While the Commission has declared that the 1951 Convention is the relevant 
international agreement in relation to asylum22, it is unclear whether a state 
must have ratified the 1951 Convention for it to be applicable.  As the 
Commission has accepted that the 1951 Convention forms ‘part of 
developments in the corpus of international human rights law more broadly 
that are properly taken into account in evaluating states’ human rights 
obligations in the Inter-American system23’, it could apply the Convention 
regardless of whether a state has ratified it.  The right of non-refoulement 
within article 27 ADRDM encapsulates that held within article 33 of the 1951 
Convention, however, and is therefore subject to its limitations.  That is not to 
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say though that the 1951 Convention is the only international instrument 
relevant to article 27 ADRDM; article 3 of CAT could also be applicable. 
 
5.1. Non –Derogability of International Agreements within the ACHR and 
the ADRDM 
 
Article 27(1) ACHR requires that any measures a state takes derogating from 
its obligations under the convention may not be ‘inconsistent with that state’s 
other obligations under international law’.  The Commission has expressly 
stated that this prevents states from circumventing their obligations under 
other conventions.  In Abella, it declared that  
 
‘If [the Commission] finds that the rights in question are not subject to 
suspension under these humanitarian law instruments, the 
Commission should conclude that these derogation measures are in 
violation of the State Parties obligations under both the American 
Convention and the humanitarian law treaties concerned.’24 
 
This means that where a state has ratified the 1951 Convention and/or CAT, 
it cannot apply derogation measures that would violate its obligations under 
them by virtue of article 27(1) ACHR.  Additionally, as both instruments are 
‘conventions to which the state is a party’, article 27 could not be interpreted 
in a way, which would restrict any rights or freedoms established under either 
convention by operation of article 29(b) ACHR. 
 
The 1951 Convention and CAT are non-derogable in their entirety, therefore, 
where a state has ratified the 1951 Convention and/or CAT it may not take 
any measures which would have the effect of negating an obligation held 
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within either convention and, specifically, article 33 of the 1951 Convention 
and article 3 CAT.  If a state did take such measures, the Court and/or the 
Commission would have jurisdiction to rule on the matter as a violation of 
article 27 ACHR.  It is logical to conclude that because a state is unable to 
derogate from its duties under the 1951 Convention and CAT, article 22(7) 
and (8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM must similarly be non-derogable in 
order that such rights continue to be enforceable within the Inter-American 
System.  Any other conclusion would have the practical effect of negating the 
prohibition on derogation from the 1951 Convention and CAT. 
 
5.2. The Application of non–refoulement as Customary International Law 
within the Inter-American System 
 
The principle of non-refoulement of refugees is now widely recognised as a 
general principle of customary international law.  Article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice 194525 includes ‘international custom’ as 
one of the main sources of international law and the Commission has 
harnessed this idea and declared that it can use customary international law 
as ‘part of developments in the corpus of international human rights law more 
broadly that are properly taken into account in evaluating states’ human rights 
obligations in the inter-American system’26.  The customary norm of non-
refoulement can therefore be used to help inform the scope of the rights held 
within the ACHR and ADRDM, specifically article 22(7) and (8) ACHR and 
article 27 ADRDM. 
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5.3. Non-Derogability of the Customary International Law Norm of Non-
Refoulement 
 
A state can only derogate from a treaty to the extent for which that is 
expressly allowed.  The 1951 Convention does not allow for derogation, so a 
state cannot take measures that would in effect derogate from that 
convention.  Where a norm of customary international law is formed from a 
right articulated in a convention, if that right is non-derogable within the 
relevant convention so, too, is the customary international law norm that 
reflects it.  This means that those elements of the customary international law 
norm of non-refoulement that reflect article 33 of the 1951 Convention and 
article 3 CAT are, like article 33 and article 3, non-derogable.  However it 
should be noted that this customary international law norm will also retain the 
limitations to the right of non-refoulement encapsulated within article 1A (2) 
and F and article 33 of the 1951 Convention. 
 
Thus norms of customary international law are part of a state’s ‘obligations 
under international law’ and any measures a state takes under article 27 
cannot be inconsistent with them.  A state cannot therefore take any measure 
that would violate its duty not to refoule under customary international law.  
The Commission has expressly stated that article 27(1) prevents states from 
circumventing their other obligations under both conventional law and 
customary international law.  A fact illustrated by the Commission’s 
conclusions in Abella, where it affirmed that it will review the legality of a 
state’s derogation measures not only by reference to the text of article 27 
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ACHR, but also by whether the measures violated any non-derogable rights 
within humanitarian law.  The Commission specifically included customary 
humanitarian law within this category.  Clearly if this principle is applied to 
refugee law, a state cannot take derogation measures that would violate its 
obligations under the customary international law norm of non-refoulement. 
 
Where a state may accept that it cannot derogate from its obligations under 
the 1951 Convention and CAT, it may not so easily accept that it cannot take 
derogation measures which violate customary international law.  There has 
not been an international case on this point, but certain statements of the 
HRC in its General Comment 2927 would seem to suggest that although 
article 4 ICCPR stipulates that such derogation measures should not be 
‘inconsistent with its other obligations under international law’28, the HRC 
feels that only the fundamental norms of international law, as opposed to 
customary international law in its entirety, are non-derogable.  Of course a 
derogation clause is only applicable to the treaty it forms a part of.  However 
where norms of customary international law are derived from rights that are 
non-derogable within the relevant treaties, those norms of customary 
international law are similarly non-derogable. 
 
The customary international law element of non-refoulement is also non-
derogable under both the ACHR and ADRDM because of the fact that denial 
of such a norm would put at risk the majority of rights listed as non-derogable 
by article 27 (2) ACHR.  In particular, those rights within Article 3 (Right to 
Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane 
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Treatment), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 
(Freedom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), 
Article 19 (Rights of the Child) and Article 23 (Right to Participate in 
Government).  The right to non-refoulement is specifically designed to prevent 
people being returned to states where their right to life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.  Clearly if the right of non-
refoulement is not adhered to, a person could be returned to a state where 
their right to life, right to humane treatment, right to religion, right to participate 
in government or freedom from ex post facto laws is at risk.  Less obviously a 
person’s right to juridical personality, family and the rights of the child are at 
risk.  A person who is unable to legally challenge their return to an ‘unsafe’ 
state by operation of the denial of the norm of non-refoulement is in effect 
denied the right to a juridical personality in the state that refouled him.   
 
Without necessarily accepting that non-refoulement is a peremptory norm of 
international law, the Executive Committee of UNHCR has been suggesting 
that the refugee law principle of non-refoulement amounts to a rule of jus 
cogens from as early as 1982.  In the Inter-American system, the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration stated 20 years ago that the principle of non-
refoulement ‘should be recognized and respected in the present state of 
international law, as a principle of jus cogens’.  Neither the Executive 
Committee conclusions nor the 1984 Cartagena Declaration have the force of 
law or create any binding legal obligations, but they are persuasive.  The fact 
that OAS member states have accepted that the norm of non-refoulement is 
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jus cogens is given weight by continual OAS General Assembly resolutions 
encouraging states to ratify the 1951 Convention, acknowledging the 
Cartagena Declaration with approval and exhorting OAS states to incorporate 
its findings within their nationals laws.  If the right to non-refoulement is 
accepted as a peremptory norm, then it would clearly be non-derogable. 
 
While the scope of the jus cogens element of the refugee law norm of non-
refoulement is mapped out by the definition of ‘refugee’ and article 33 of the 
1951 Convention, the status of the human rights element of the norm relies 
on the consequences of its violation.  If freedom from torture is a peremptory 
norm of international law, then is accepted that the non-return of an individual 
to a state where they would be tortured is also a peremptory norm.  In 
essence it is not so much that the human rights norm of non-refoulement is in 
and of itself peremptory, but the violation that it prevents is.  A state may not 
therefore refoule an individual where any of these peremptory norms are in 
danger of being violated.  The logical conclusion to draw is that the norm of 
non-refoulement is an integral part of those fundamental values that are 
already international peremptory norms. 
 
5.4 Non -Derogability of the Human Rights Law Norm of Non-
Refoulement 
 
It is suggested that the human rights element of non-refoulement is located 
within the content of each fundamental non-derogable right.  The practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights points to some new developments in 
 20
this area that could help inform the scope of the right of non-refoulement 
within the Inter-American system.  The European Court of Human Rights has 
developed a precedent of placing certain ‘procedural’ rights directly within the 
articles relating to fundamental non-derogable rights.  In Kilic v Turkey, the 
European Court of Human Rights held that the sentence ‘Everyone’s right to 
life shall be protected by law’29 within article 2 ECHR, enjoins a state to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.  In this 
case the European Court of Human Rights felt that the appropriate steps 
were the putting in place of effective criminal law provisions and the like to 
deter the commission of offences against the person.  The appropriate steps 
do, however, vary depending on the circumstances of each case.  In the 
situation where a person is being returned to a state where they are danger of 
being tortured, insistence on non-refoulement is the obvious and appropriate 
step. 
 
In Soering v U.K., The European Court of Human Rights implicitly brought the 
right of non-refoulement within article 3, and has continued to apply that 
principle in later cases.  The European Court of Human Rights accepted that 
permitting refoulement in such circumstances would make inroads in the non-
derogability of the prohibition of torture.  The HRC has also recognised this.  
The HRC explicitly stated within its General Comment 2030 that States parties 
must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of 
their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.  It has further adopted this view in 
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its examination of individual petitions31.  In its recent General Comment 31, 
the HRC specifically stated that  
 
‘the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and  
ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all 
persons under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, 
deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the 
Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in 
any country to which the person may subsequently be removed’32 
 
The right to non-refoulement is not just an inherent part of the prohibition on 
the use of torture however, but is also an integral part of all fundamental non-
derogable rights within ADRDM and ACHR. 
 
The Commission has already found, in the Haitian Centre for Human Rights 
case33, that a state breaches the right to life within article 1 ADRDM, where it 
repatriates refugees who later lose their lives due to being identified as 
‘repatriates’ within their country of origin.  It further held that a state breaches 
a person’s right to security within article 1 ADRDM, where it repatriates 
refugees who were as a result later exposed to acts of brutality by the 
returning state’s military and supporters.  Although in this case the 
Commission only found a breach of article 1 ARDRM in cases of actual 
violation, it appeared to have based its findings on existing international case 
law on extradition.  It is quite clear in existing jurisprudence that where a state 
takes a decision concerning a person within its jurisdiction and the necessary 
and foreseeable consequence is that that person’s rights under the relevant 
international instrument are violated within another jurisdiction, the state that 
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returned that person, in whatever way, has itself violated its duties under the 
relevant international instrument.  This approach opens the door for the 
Commission to declare in the future that a state cannot refoule where there is 
a potential, as opposed to an actual, violation of a person’s fundamental 
human right in question. 
 
5.5. Difference in Burden of Proof 
 
The difference between the refugee law norm of non-refoulement and the 
human rights norm of non-refoulement lies not just in the limitations and 
question of derogability, but also in the standard of proof required by each.  In 
refugee status determinations the standard of proof is usually whether there is 
a reasonable degree of likelihood34 that the individual would be 
persecuted/have their life or freedom threatened.  This is a lower standard of 
proof than that required under human rights law.  As stated above, the 
standard of proof applicable to engage a state’s responsibility for a violation 
that occurred due to them returning an individual to another state under 
human rights law is whether there was a ‘real risk’ that, that individual would 
be subjected to the violation.  Although neither the Court nor the Commission 
have addressed this issue, both the HRC and the European Court of Human 
Rights have used this idea of a ‘real risk’ to inform their decisions in the past.  
It is submitted that it is likely that the Inter-American system would use a 
similar standard of proof.  It should be noted, however, that there are 
differences in the way the European Court of Human Rights and the HRC 
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have applied the test, with the European Court of Human Rights appearing to 
have applied the test less restrictively than the HRC. 
 
In Mrs G.T. v Australia, the ‘real risk’ test was framed in such a way that proof 
of the receiving state’s actual intention to violate the individual’s fundamental 
rights appeared to be required before the right not to be returned could be 
invoked.  This is a very high standard of proof and one that is almost 
impossible for the individual to fulfil in most cases.  It should be noted in this 
regard that the only time the HRC has found the ‘necessary and foreseeable 
consequence’ test fulfilled is in cases of extradition, where the intent of the 
state to violate a fundamental human right was inescapable.  The European 
Court of Human Rights has been more forgiving and in Chahal v. UK looked 
at the general threat of human rights violations to persons within the same 
group as the petitioner to determine whether that individual was under a real 
risk of an article 3 violation if refouled as opposed to whether there was proof 
of the receiving state’s intent to torture that particular individual35.  Neither the 
Court nor the Commission have so far given a decision on the merits 
preventing a state from returning individuals where there was a real risk that 
such individuals would be in danger of their rights being violated in the 
receiving country.  The Commission has, however, already used a similar test 
to the one used by the European Court of Human Rights and the HRC in a 
non-refoulement case36 and would probably use the same test in any future 
non-refoulement issues before it. 
 
 24
This high standard of proof could lead to a situation where a person, who 
would be entitled to the protection of article 33 but for the operation of article 
1F or article 33(2), would fail to be protected from non-refoulement in human 
rights law.  So far all the cases regarding the human rights element of the 
norm of non-refoulement have related to those who have an individualised 
claim of a violation of fundamental rights, that is, those who would be singled 
out from the rest of the population.  Although it could be argued that the 
applicant in Chahal v. Austria received protection solely due to the fact of clan 
warfare in Somalia and not in relation to any individualised claim, it was 
stressed in this judgement that not only had the applicant been involved in the 
activities of the opposition group but the respondent state had tself accepted 
that the applicant was at risk of treatment contrary to article 3, if returned.  It 
would be interesting to see how a human rights body would deal with a claim 
from a humanitarian refugee who, although being under a real risk of their 
human rights being violated on return to their state of origin, was in no 
different situation from another national of the same state and the respondent 
state denied there would be a real risk of an article 3 violation on return.  
While the European Court of Human Rights may entertain such a claim, 
judging from the jurisprudence of the HRC so far it would appear that such a 
person could not satisfy their standard of proof.  The response of the Court or 
Commission would be dependant on which approach they chose to follow.  
Although, taking account of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration and their use of 
such instruments to interpret the content of the ACHR and the ADRDM, it 




5.6. The Non-Derogability of Article 22(8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM 
 
The Court stated in its advisory opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency 
Situations that  
 
‘Article 27(2) must be interpreted in good faith, keeping in mind the 
object and purpose of ACHR and the need to prevent a conclusion that 
could give rise to the suppression of the enjoyment or exercise of the 
rights and freedoms recognised in ACHR or to restrict them to a 
greater extent than is provided for therein37’. 
 
It went on to add that 
 
‘State Parties not only have the obligation to recognize and to respect 
the rights and freedoms of all persons, they also have the obligation to 
protect and ensure the exercise of such rights and freedoms by means 
of the respective guarantees, that is, through suitable measures that 
will in all circumstances ensure the effectiveness of these rights and 
freedoms.’38. 
 
It is suggested that the right of non-refoulement is such a guarantee against 
the violation of the rights and freedoms of all persons.  Further, the right of 
non-refoulement is in an analogous position to that of judicial guarantees and, 
therefore, in that respect, non-derogable. 
 
In its advisory opinion regarding Judicial Guarantees in States of 
Emergency39, the Court accepted that even though the right of due process 
was not properly a ‘judicial guarantee’, it was necessary to enable the judicial 
guarantees to be effective within the context of article 27.  The reason that 
judicial guarantees are non-derogable is because they are essential to ensure 
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the protection of non-derogable rights40.  Non-refoulement is similarly 
essential; without it persons could be returned to states where there was a 
real risk that their non-derogable rights would be violated.  Following this 
reasoning, the right of non-refoulement, specifically article 22(7) and (8) 




The principle of non-refoulement is the very foundation upon which all rights 
of refugees/asylum seekers stand.  It is the gateway right that allows them 
access to all their other human rights within a state.  Once a person is legally 
within the jurisdiction of a state, they are entitled to the full and free exercise 
of the rights and freedoms contained in the human rights instruments that 
state has ratified.  This is what makes the norm of non-refoulement so crucial.  
It is, as the Commission has recognised, a fundamental human right.  In this 
context therefore it is vital that the norm of non-refoulement is recognised as 
non-derogable and more than that, as a very part of the fundamental norms it 
protects: life, liberty and humane treatment.  This paper has attempted to 
elucidate the different ways in which it can be shown that the norm of non-
refoulement is non-derogable.  While it is relatively straightforward to prove 
that the right to non-refoulement contained within international agreements is 
non-derogable, it is more difficult to contend that the customary law norm of 
non-refoulement is non-derogable in and of itself.  There is however no 
customary international law derogation clause and as such you can not 
derogate from a norm of international customary law.  While a norm of 
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customary international law may be inherently limited, due to the fact that its 
‘foundation’ treaty provision is derogable, the customary international law 
norm of non-refoulement has no such limitation.  In fact to the extent that the 
customary international law norm goes beyond the 1951 Convention 
definition, it is still non-derogable insofar as it is an integral part of the non-
derogable rights it protects. 
 
The norm of non-refoulement is akin to the right to due process of law.  It is 
an ancillary right whose value is found not in the right itself but in the rights it 
seeks to protect.  It has been shown that the norm of non-refoulement in both 
its human rights and refugee law elements is non-derogable through a variety 
of means.  Although some of the lines of arguments overlap to the extent that 
they cover the same ground in a different way, they all have a different 
emphasis and can be used separately, in the alternative or concurrently, to 
add strength to the overall proposition.  While states that have ratified the 
1951 Convention are unable to derogate from it, states that have not, are still 
bound by it to the extent to which its precepts are customary norms.  This 
means that no state can derogate from the fundamental norm of non-
refoulement.  Additionally, it is important to emphasise that no OAS state can 
derogate from the customary right of non-refoulement in relation to those 
individuals who come within the refugee definition spelled out in the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration.  In relation to the human rights element of non-
refoulement, states cannot derogate from it to the extent that it is an inherent 
part of the fundamental right it protects.  Further, it is submitted that article 
22(7) and (8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM are non-derogable both by virtue 
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of the 1951 Convention and customary international law but also in 
connection with the fact that the rights contained in the articles are essential 
to ensure protection of the fundamental non-derogable rights contained in 
article 27(2) ACHR. 
 
The Court has yet to pronounce on the scope, content and weight of the norm 
of non-refoulement within the Inter-American system.  Until it does, the 
question to what extent the norm of non-refoulement is non-derogable within 
the Inter-American system will remain unanswered in any legally binding 
form.  On the other hand, the Commission is becoming increasingly pro-active 
on matters relating to refugees/asylum seekers.  In order to facilitate such a 
determination, an advisory opinion on the subject could be put before the 
Court or an individual petition, argued along one or more of the grounds 
outlined in the body of this article, brought before the Commission. 
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